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NATURE OF CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents (hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs) 
agree with the statement of facts as set forth in the brief of 
appellant (hereinafter referred to as April). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIVE 
LEGEND AND THE AWARD OF DAMAGES ARE RES JUDICATA 
Appellant argues under its present Point I. that "The 
trial court awarded plaintiffs inconsistent remedies and un-
justly enriched them.'1 This argument was presented to and 
rejected by this court on the prior appeal.^ Thereafter this 
argument was again presented to and rejected by this court in 
April's petition for rehearing.^ The petition for rehearing 
was denied. 
1. April's Brief, p.5 
"Plaintiffs are to receive an amount in damages virtually 
equivalent to what they would have received had they sold 
their shares in the public offering. The trial court also 
told plaintiffs that they could keep their shares. Thus, 
plaintiffs are to receive the proceeds from the sale of 
their stock without actually selling that stock." 
2. For comparison purposes we quote from April's prior brief, 
p. 19 
"Thus, plaintiffs will now have their stock without restric-
tive legend, making the stock fully marketable. Should the 
price increase and should plaintiffs decide to sell, they 
would be entitled to whatever benefit they could obtain 
from the value of the stock. But, of course, plaintiffs 
are not satisfied with just the stock. They also want to 
keep the stock and obtain damages for the failure to in-
clude the shares in the 1972 public offering." 
3. For comparison purposes we quote from April's Brief on 
petition for rehearing (ps.12-16) which it reiterates in its 
present brief (as footnote 3, ps.10-13) almost verbatim: 
III. The Court's opinion awards plaintiffs incon-
sistent remedies and unjustly enriches them. 
This Court has awarded plaintiffs damages because 
their shares were not sold in the 1972 public offering. 
Though this Court's opinion does not deal with the issue, 
plaintiffs are still the owners of their shares and are 
still entitled to possession of them. If the price for 
these shares should rise, plaintiffs will be able to take 
advantage of that price increase by selling their shares. 
They will thus enjoy the double benefit of the sale of 
their stock and a substantial damage award. The law does 
not permit double recovery. 
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April argues under its present Point II., "Plaintiffs 
are foreclosed from recovering damages because of a ruling of 
the trial court from which plaintiffs took no appeal.11 The 
crux of plaintiffs1 prior appeal was that damages should have 
been awarded. This court's prior decision was that damages 
should have been awarded, which is res judicata. 
They are entitled to their shares without restrictive 
legend; they are not entitled to the double recovery 
afforded by money damages. 
Plaintiffs1 claims are perhaps best analogized to 
the law of sales. Plaintiffs claim that they are en-
titled to what they would have received had their shares 
been included in the 1972 offering; they are seeking the 
equivalent of specific performance of an action for the 
price. If they are asking for what is in effect specific 
performance, plaintiffs must give up the ownership of 
their shares. The same is true of action for the price. 
Under both the Uniform Commercial Code and pre-Code law 
an action for the price is only possible where the sel-
ler has delivered goods to the defaulting bujrer or the 
risk of loss has passed from the seller to the buyer. 
See U.C.C. §2-709. A seller is not entitled to sue for 
the sales price and at the some time keep the goods to 
be sold. The obvious reason for this rule is to prevent 
the seller from being unjustly enriched by being paid for 
goods which he is going to keep. 
In Murray v. Americare Medical Designs, Inc. 123 Ga. 
App. 557, 181 S.E.2d 871 (Ga. App. 1971)7 the plaintiff, 
who had supplied plans and supervised construction of a 
medical building being erected by the defendants, brought 
suit for breach of the construction agreement. 
On a petition for rehearing after judgment for the 
plaintiff the issue concerned the ownership of certain 
cabinets and hardware items to be placed in the building. 
The court found that the evidence as to the location and 
ownership of the cabinets was conflicting. It resolved 
the dilemma by stating that the defendant would, by paying 
the judgment, be entitled to take possession of the cabi-
nets and other hardware items. As the Court stated: 
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None of these issues is properly before the court. 
II. 
INCONSISTENT REMEDIES WERE NOT AWARDED 
Plaintiffs were awarded specific performance of the 
agreement that they should have unrestricted stock and were 
also awarded damages for having been prevented from sel-
ling the stock. Those awards are not inconsistent. As 
stated in 71 Am.Jur, 2d Specific Performance, §216 p.277, 
"A court of equity, having jurisdiction for the purpose of 
specifically enforcing performance of a contract, has full 
jurisdiction, in addition to decreeing specific performance, 
to award compensation for delay of the defendant in the per-
formance of the contract, as, for example, for loss of rents 
and profits resulting from delay in the conveyance of land, 
for loss resulting from delay in the purchase of corporate 
stock, or for business losses resulting from delay in the 
performance of the contract by the defendant.11 
April argues that, "Plaintiffs are to receive an amount 
in damages virtually equivalent to what they would have 
MIt is obvious, however, that when this 
defendant pays off the judgment against 
him representing damages equivalent to 
the purchase price of the casework and 
hardware he becomes by that fact the 
owner of the merchandise and entitled to 
whatever value it may have, since to al-
low the plaintiff or the manufacturer 
full payment plus goods involved would 
result in an unjust enrichment. In this 
connection see Code Ann. 109A-2-709. [The 
Georgia Provision of Section 2-709 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code]." (181 S.E.2d at 873-874.) 
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received had they sold their shares in the public offering."^ 
April then concludes that, since they still have their shares, 
"...plaintiffs are to receive the proceeds from the sale of 
their stock without actually selling that stock."^ The fallacy 
with that argument is that the reason the amount of damages 
resulting from not being able to sell was "virtually11 the 
value of the shares, is that during the period April refused 
to recognize the validity of the shares, or their tradeability, 
the value of the shares declined "virtually11 to zero. The full 
value of the shares at time of judgment, 87 1/2 cents, was de-
ducted in computation of damages. The coincindence that the 
shares became nearly worthless does not create a double re-
covery situation. There is no more double recovery here than 
there would have been had the stock only declined slightly and 
an amount in damages, much less than the equivalent value of 
the shares,had been awarded. So long as the actual value of 
the shares at time of judgment was deducted, whatever it may 
have been, there is no double recovery. 
If there had been an award of the value of the shares, be-
cause April had converted them, then plaintiffs1 retention of 
shares would have constituted a double recovery. Plaintiffs 
profferred to treat the shares as having been converted. 
April objected thereto, and the trial court refused the proffer.^ 
4. April's Brief, p.5 (emphasis added) 
5. April's Brief, p.6 
6. Aprilfs Brief, p.5 
7. (R-381) 
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Had it been accepted, plaintiffs would then have received an 
additional award of damages of 87 1/2 cents per share and 
would no longer have their shares. Instead, that amount was 
deducted from the damage award and plaintiffs kept their 
shares. 
III. 
DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY AWARDED 
April argues that plaintiffs should have appealed the 
trial court's refusal of their proffer to surrender their 
shares and to recover their value in a claim for conversion.° 
April is confusing the recovery of damages for decline in 
value with recovery of damages for conversion of the remain-
ing value of the shares. The latter has never been awarded. 
Plaintiffs still have their shares, worth 87 1/2 cents, as of 
the date of the prior decree, and they have not been paid 
87 1/2 cents. Therefore, there was no need to appeal. 
April asserts that, MIf defendant has to pay for plain-
tiffs' stock, it should not be deprived of that stock..." 
April has not paid for the stock. It refused to pay the 
87 1/2 cents value and objected to plaintiffs' tender of the 
shares into court. 
April, in this appeal, is attempting a second petition 
for rehearing of the former decision. This court's decree 
8. April's Brief, p.13 
9. April's Brief, p.15 
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"...remanded for the entry of judgment against defendant for 
damages for breach of contract, which damages would be the 
difference between the present market value and the highest 
price obtainable during the period of the breach...11 (emphasis 
added). That was done. The deduction of the present market 
value precludes any unjust enrichment. 
April's argument that the stock may appreciate in value 
and plaintiffs would then be unjustly enriched is not persua-
sive. The stock may also decline. 
The Utah cases cited by April on election of remedies 
are distinguishable because they do involve election of the 
inconsistent remedies of either rescinding or of enforcing 
the contract. Plaintiffs here sued to specifically enforce 
the contract and to recover damages for breach, which reme-
dies are not inconsistent. 
The Colorado case cited by April, Thornburg v. Homestead 
Minerals Corporation, 513 P.2d 219 (Colo. App. 1973),ll is 
only an appellate court opinion. Furthermore, it is distin-
guishable because in that case, in a prior action, the plain-
tiff had sued only to get clear title to the shares and not 
for damages. The corporation asserted plaintiff was thereby 
estopped from later claiming damages. The appellate court 
10. April's Brief, p.6, Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Univer-
sal CI.T. Credit Corp., 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045 
(1955); Rogers v. United Western Minerals Co., 8 Utah 
2d 1, 326 P.2d 1019 (1958); Midvale Motors, Inc. v. 
Sanders, 19 Utah 2d 403, 432 P.2d 37 (1967) 
11. April's Brief, p.7 
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said that, MBy asking only for clear title in the first ac-
tion, she thereafter assumed the risk of market fluctuation." 
12 April cites an appeals court decision from Georgia, 
Murray v. Americare Medical Designs, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 557, 
181 S.E.2d 871 (1971), which simply held that a supplier was 
not entitled to both the value of materials supplied and the 
return of the materials furnished because it would result in 
unjust enrichment. With this we agree, but plaintiffs here 
are not unjustly enriched because they have not recovered the 
value of the shares. 
April cites Owen v. Merts, 240 Ark. 1080, 405 S.W. 2d 
13 273 (1966) for the proposition that one cannot recover both 
specific performance and damages. We would agree with that 
proposition where such remedies are inconsistent as they 
sometimes are. In Owen v. Merts, the plaintiffs were suing 
to acquire shares of stock, rather than to sell them or to 
make them saleable. In our case, plaintiffs did not seek to 
acquire stock. They already had it. A buyer may have an 
election of remedies, to sue for damages or for specific per-
formance of the contract of sale. Here, instead of wanting 
to acquire shares, plaintiffs wanted to sell the shares they 
already had and which April refused to allow to be traded. 
Plaintiffs here asked the court to make their shares saleable. 
The inconsistency claimed in Owen v. Merts of wanting to ac-
quire shares and get damages also is not present. Plaintiffs 
12. April's Brief, p.11, footnote 3 
13. April's Brief, p.8 
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here seek the right to sell their shares and damages because 
April prevented a sale, which are entirely consistent. 
Owen v. Merts relies upon Virginia Public Service Co. v. 
Steindler, 166 Va. 686, 187 S.E.353 (1936).14 The Virginia 
facts are also distinquishable. There, plaintiffs sought 
and were awarded not only registration of their shares but 
also past accrued dividends and interest thereon. The court 
there found that it would be inconsistent to rule that plain-
tiffs were owners as of a previous date and thus entitled to 
benefits of ownership, and not be subject to detriments of 
such ownership, such as value fluctuation. Here, no dividends 
are involved. 
Further, in Virginia the court relied upon the fact that 
plaintiffs could have sold at any time, saying the alleged 
loss was ''entirely predicated on the date on which complain-
ants might have sold the stock according to their whim,11 and 
that plaintiffs could have sold their shares at any time inclu-
ding a time prior to trial, and that the claimed damages were 
therefor uncertain and speculative. Here, plaintiffs could 
not sell their shares. 
The court in Virginia was considering two alternatives 
for plaintiffs, either a suit for conversion, in which event 
the company would become the owner of the shares and plaintiffs 
would be awarded damages, or a suit for specific performance 
14. April's Brief, p.9 
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to have shares registered, in which event plaintiffs would 
become the owners, and said, "It is elementary that the com-
plainants were not entitled to both the stock and its value." 
The distinction is that here, plaintiffs have not been awar-
ded the value of the shares. They did not sue for conversion. 
The value of the shares was deducted from the award. The 
action was to force April to perform its agreement to make 
the shares tradeable and for damages because they had not 
been able to sell their shares. 
Unlike the Virginia situation where plaintiffs could 
have sold at any time, plaintiffs here still haven't been 
able to sell. Not only is the relief granted here not in-
consistent, both facets of the relief granted are essential 
for adequate recovery. If plaintiffs had to elect between 
an award for decline in value of shares and an award that 
the shares be made tradeable, they would not obtain full 
relief. They would wind up with shares of no value because 
they could not be sold. As stated in 71 Am.Jur. 2d Specific 
Performance, §216, p.278 "...equity may, when decreeing 
specific performance, award pecuniary compensation along 
with specific performance when the decree would otherwise 
not give complete and full relief,..." 
Professor Moore recognizes that both specific perfor-
mance and damages may be awarded. He states, "...in a suit 
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for specific performance the plaintiff may demand 
1(1) that defendant be required specifically to 
perform said agreement, (2) damages in the sum of 
one thousand dollars,...! 
Footnote 9. Demand (1) for specific per-
formance is a claim for equitable relief; 
and demand (2) for $1,000 in damages is 
incidental and cumulative to demand (1) 
and is within equitable jurisdiction. " 
This court, in its prior decision in this case, recog-
nized that complete recovery should be granted by ordering 
the award of damages in addition to the removal of the 
restrictive legend. Prior to that decision this court had 
recognized that both specific performance and damages could 
be decreed. In Johnson v. Jones, 109 U.92, 164 P.2d 893, 
896, this court, in a case wherein specific performance was 
awarded to a contract buyer of a duplex as well as damages 
for loss of rental from failure to convey, said: 
The third general argument is that the court 
erred in awarding damages for loss of rentals in 
an amount of the entire rental value of the pro-
perty, even if specific performance could be 
decreed. In view of what we have said herein-
above, this contention is unsound, for if appellant 
had performed, the respondents would either have en-
joyed the actual possession of the apartment occupied 
by appellant and collected the rent from the tenants 
occupying the other apartment, or if both apartments 
had been rented they would have collected the rent 
on both. 
15. Moore's Federal Practice 2A, 1(8.18, ps. 1802-1804 
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IV. 
APRIL CANNOT NOW OBJECT TO 
THE AWARD OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
The original decree ordered April to remove the restric-
tive legend, but did not award damages. Plaintiffs appealed 
from the refusal to award damages. April did not appeal from 
the order that the legends be removed. Both the award of 
damages and order to remove legends are now res judicata. 
V. 
THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS 
There is no double recovery, hence there is no violation 
of due process. 
VI. 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AWARD IS NOT EXCESSIVE 
April argues that prejudgment interest should run only 
from the date of this court's ruling. Such interest would 
be post-judgment interest. 
16. April's Brief, p.16 
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April quotes from the early case of Fell v. Union Pacific 
Railway Co,, 32 Utah 101, 88 Pac. 1003 (1907), which allowed 
prejudgment interest.-^ Plaintiffs have no quarrel with the 
holding in that case, but cannot go along with April's conclu-
sion that, because interest would vary depending upon amount 
of deduction for the residual value of the shares at time of 
judgment, it should not be awarded. The amount of prejudg-
ment interest is never ascertained until date of judgment 
because the amount thereof would vary depending upon the 
date of trial. The residual value was ascertainable at any 
given judgment date. The fact that it was not ascertained 
until the court entered judgment because only then can the 
credited residual value be determined, should not bar the 
award of interest. The rationale of the rule allowing 
interest is that plaintiffs should, as nearly as possible, 
be placed in a position comparable to that in which they 
would have been had the wrong not occurred. As stated in 
Fell, 
Is there any reason why a person sustaining injury 
and damage to his property from the negligent act 
of another should not receive just what he has lost 
as nearly as this may be accomplished in a court of 
justice? If a person's property is destroyed or 
damaged, why is he not entitled to be compensated 
to the full extent of its value in money so that he 
may replace the same with other property of a like 
17. April's Brief, p.16 
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nature? If on the day of its injury or destruction 
he restores or replaces it with his own money, why 
is he not entitled to interest on that money to the 
date of repayment? If he had loaned the money to 
some one, he certainly would be entitled to interest, 
and, if he borrowed it from some one, he would likely 
have to pay interest for its use. By being awarded 
legal interest, therefore, he is simply placed in 
statu quo, and nothing short of this is full compen-
sation, and that is just what the law aims to accom-
plish. Is it an answer to say that the damages are 
unliquidated, and therefore interest is not to be 
allowed? This, to our minds, is no reason at all 
in case of injury to or destruction of property.1° 
It would be unreasonable to say that if the stock had 
become worthless, and therefore there were no residual value 
with which April was credited, that April should be exhono-
rated from paying interest. 
The ultimate goal of making plaintiffs whole should be 
achieved. Plaintiffs are only made whole by awarding them 
interest for the period during which they could have been 
using the net proceeds of sale of the stock. 
All of the cases on which April relies in arguing that 
interest should not be awarded, actually award prejudgment 
interest. If any language used in the decisions indicated 
recovery of interest should be allowed under the facts of 
the particular case, that is not a holding that interest should 
not be awarded under other facts, such as those in this case. 
Any such language would be dictum. 
18. Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., P.88 ps. 1005-06 
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April is really arguing that plaintiffs should not re-
cover interest because the damages were unliquidated until 
date of judgment. Such contention has been rejected by Fell 
and by all other subsequent decisions relied upon by April. 
In Fell the court did not say that prejudgment interest 
should commence to run from the date the amount of damages 
is actually ascertained. Rather, it said that damages must 
be ascertained as of a particular time by applying fixed rules 
of evidence and known standards of value. Here, the particular 
time that damages were ascertained was at the time of the entry 
of judgment. The Fell decision was differentiating between a 
situation on the one hand in which damages had all accrued at 
time of judgment and on the other hand, a situation in which 
post-judgment damage would be accruing, compensation for which 
was to be included in the award. In the latter case prejudg-
ment interest would not be allowed. Plaintiffs are not in the 
latter situation. The court said, 
The true test to be applied as to whether interest 
should be allowed before judgment in a given case 
or not is, therefore, not whether the damages are 
unliquidated or otherwise, but whether the injury 
and consequent damages are complete and must be 
ascertained as of a particular time and in accor-
dance with fixed rules of evidence and known 
standards of value, which the court or jury must 
follow in fixing the amount, rather than be guided 
by their best judgment in assessing the amount to 
be allowed, for past as well as for future injury, 
or for elements that cannot be measured by any 
fixed standards of value...As the case at bar falls 
-15-
clearly within the rule where the amount is com-
puted as of a fixed time, and in accordance xvdth 
fixed rules of evidence as to value, the court 
did not err in computing, on the amount of damages 
found, interest at the legal rate.^ 
In Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., U.2d 
546 P.2d 885, 887, this court's most recent decision on pre-
judgment interest, it is clearly shown that the important 
criterion is whether or not damages are complete at the time 
of trial. The court quoted that language of Fell allowing 
interest except where damages are continuing and may reach 
beyond the time of trial. If complete at time of trial, and 
if amounts can be computed at the time of trial, interest 
should be awarded. The court in Uinta after quoting Fell 
said: 
In the class of cases, therefore, where the damage 
is complete, and the amount of the loss is fixed 
as of a particular time, there is--there can be--
no reason why interest should be withheld merely 
because the damages are unliquidated. There are 
certain cases of unliquidated damages where in-
terest cannot be allowed. In all personal injury 
cases, cases of death by wrongful act, libel, 
slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, 
assault and battery, and all cases where the damages 
are incomplete and are peculiarly within the pro-
vince of the jury to assess at the time of the trial, 
no interest is permissible. But this is so because 
the damages are continuing and may even reach beyond 
the time of trial. 
There can be no question about the propriety of 
allowing interest for the destruction of personal 
property prior to judgment where value can be 
measured by facts and figures. In the instant 
matter the cost of rebuilding the compressor stage 
19. Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., supra, p.1007 
20. An even more recent case allowing prejudgment interest 
because the amount due was ascertainable is Jack B. 
Parson Construction Co. v. Utah U , 552 P.2d 107. 
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was subject to computation. Therefore it was er-
ror for the court to fail to award interest from 
the time of destruction. 
Applying the above rationale, prejudgment interest should 
be awarded because: 
1. The damage was complete at date of judgment and no 
damages are to be allowed for future injury or for elements 
that cannot be measured by fixed standards of value. 
2. The amount of loss is fixed as of date of judgment. 
3. Damages are not peculiarly within the province of 
the trier of fact to assess at time of judgment, but are 
awarded in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known 
standards of value. 
4. Value can be measured by facts and figures and 
damages are subject to computation. 
5. Plaintiffs can only be made whole by an award of 
interest on the sums they should have been able to realize 
by sale of the shares at the time of April's public offering. 
CONCLUSION 
This court has already adjudicated the issues now raised 
by April other than the award of interest. Utah's long line 
of cases awarding interest, regardless of whether or not 
damages were liquidated, support the award of interest here. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
^ / ^ - ^ ^ ^ 
^ John W. Lowe 
( /Brayton, Lowe & Hurley 
v Attorneys for Respondents 
